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Cross-Border Insider Trading
Donald C. Langevoort*
Some forty years have now passed since the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began seriously to
attack the problem of insider trading in its seminal Cady, Roberts
decision.' Since then, a complex pattern of regulation has evolved,
largely through a common law process of judicial interpretation of
the open-ended antifraud provision of the federal securities laws,
Rule 10b-5. While many interpretive questions still remain open,
U.S. law in this area broadly prohibits trading based on material
nonpublic information when:
(1) the trader directly or indirectly owes a fiduciary duty to
marketplace traders on the other side of the transaction;2
(2) the trader has misappropriated the information from a
source to which he owes some kind of fiduciary duty;3 or
(3) the trader possesses tender-offer related information
derived from either the bidder or the target.4
These prohibitions on trading carry with them a corresponding duty
to refrain from "tipping" others. If this is violated, the "tippee" can
be held liable as a co-venturer with the tipper/insider.5
As far back as the early 1980's, the SEC began to act against
instances of cross-border insider trading: situations where the
pattern of trading involved some conduct outside the United
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC.
1. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961); Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation,
99 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1319 (1999). Before Cady, Roberts, only Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought to address the insider trading problem,
and it was substantially limited in scope.
2. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78, Rule 14e-3.
5. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The test used in Dirks is (1) whether
the insider was breaching a fiduciary duty by seeking a personal benefit via the
tipping and (2) whether the tippee knew or had reason to know of the breach.
Whether this awkward test applies in misappropriation cases is open to debate.
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States.6 In a number of such cases, foreign persons used foreign
brokerage accounts to trade in the securities of multi-national
companies on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. In
1999, for example, the SEC brought a case involving trading by an
Italian portfolio manager through the Swiss office of a brokerage
firm in the stock of a Netherlands corporation that was the subject
of a takeover bid by a Swiss company.7 The incidence of cross-
border insider trading cases is, of course, what led the SEC to begin
to negotiate memoranda of understanding with various countries to
facilitate their investigation.
We are seeing an increasing stream of such cases. That should
not be surprising in light of the increasing globalization of the
securities markets and the rapid increase in the number of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions-the setting in which the largest
insider trading temptation exists.8  As persons from various
countries become involved in the confidential negotiation or
planning of such deals, the locus of insider trading problems
spreads.
Currently, there is no formal SEC policy on when U.S. insider
trading rules (or indeed Rule 10b-5 generally) will be applied
extraterritorially. If one can glean anything from SEC action
during the last twenty years, it is that the trading site-the use of
U.S. market mechanisms-that counts most.' Certainly, neither the
trader nor the issuer need be U.S.-based. What I wish to do in this
paper is articulate what I think is sensible enforcement policy for a
nation-whether the U.S. or any other-to adopt. By this, I do not
want to focus on the question of the extent of a country's
jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with the dictates of
6. See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italania, 92 F.R.D. 111 (1981); Pitt,
Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities
Markets, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 375 (1987).
7. SEC v. Euro Security Fund, [1999 Tr. Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
par. 90,433 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The trading was on the New York Stock Exchange,
and the principal office of the brokerage firm used to execute the trades was in
New York.
8. See Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations
Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany and Australia, 66 U. CINN. L. REv. 1133 (1998).
9. The fact that shares of the company in question are traded in the U.S.
means both that domestic market mechanisms are being abused. Presumably, U.S.
interest on these grounds could also come from the fact that there is substantial
U.S. investor interest and ownership of shares traded on domestic markets. The
1989 EC Directive on Insider Trading is similarly vague, although it clearly confers
jurisdiction on the country where the trading occurred.
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international law. '° Familiar principles of international law give
immense scope to jurisdiction, permitting enforcement either when
conduct in question occurs in substantial part in the regulating
country or has significant effects in that country. But clearly, either
through prosecutorial restraint or judicial limitation, a nation can
choose to give lesser scope as a matter of prudence, comity and the
wise expenditure of limited investigatory resources."
This is an issue that all sophisticated capital marketplace
nations ought think through. But I recognize that at present, at
least, the U.S. is the most likely nation to act extraterritorially, even
when insider trading laws exist in the other nations involved. Four
things tempt a country like the U.S. to extend its insider trading
jurisdiction. First, conduct might be unlawful domestically, but not
unlawful in the country to which the jurisdictional reach is directed.
This is possible, though in light of the rapid evolution of insider
trading laws throughout the world, not necessarily likely. Second
-and more likely-it is conceivable that the action might be
unlawful where it occurred, but the local authorities do not seem
likely to take action against it. One of the most obviously, and
troubling, phenomena in international securities regulation is that
even as the "law on the books" in most developed countries
converges on a common model, the commitment of surveillance
and enforcement resources varies considerably.13  It remains
primitive in many nations-perhaps deliberately so. Third, even if
local authorities take an interest, their enforcement tools may not
10. I have addressed this elsewhere. See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum
Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized
Securities Market, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., no. 4, at 241 (1992).
11. By and large, the courts have not pruned the extraterritorial scope of the
law to incorporate comity limits, though they could do so. For a call in this
direction, see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
12. So far as the U.S. is concerned, its law may actually be more restricted than
that in certain other countries that have addressed the problem via comprehensive
statutory reform, such as Australia. See James Cox, An Outsider's Perspective of
Insider Trading Regulation in Australia, 12 SYDNEY L. REV. 455 (1990). Because
U.S. law takes something of a common law form, it is difficult to state with
precision what it covers and what it does not.
13. See Barry Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets: An English
Perspective, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179 (1990). Obviously, politics plays an
important role. E.g., Resignation of Enforcement Staff Throws Stock Exchange
into Crisis, 6 WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA) no. 3, at 24 (Mar. 2000) (surveillance
staff at Philippine Stock Exchange resigns to protest political interference with
insider trading case). For an empirical demonstration of the importance of active
enforcement as opposed to mere law-adoption, see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem
Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading (unpublished manuscript, Indiana
University) (2000) (showing that positive stock price effects of insider trading
regulation come upon enforcement, not adoption of the rules).
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be up to the task.14 Most countries still use criminal law as their
primary weapon against insider trading, creating prosecutorial
difficulties in complex cases based largely on circumstantial
evidence. Countries that use civil remedies (like the U.S.) may be
able to sanction conduct that even their willing regulatory brethren
cannot. Finally, the decision to extend jurisdiction might simply be
a matter of enforcement efficiency: in a complicated case touching
on multiple countries, having one regulator exercise primary
jurisdiction over all the related conduct, no matter where it
occurred, may be the least costly form of proceeding. 5
I. National Interests at Stake in Insider Trading Regulation
When an insider trading case has a multi-national dimension,
there are four major pieces of information needed to assess a claim
of appropriate jurisdiction.6 The first is the nationalities of the
traders, as well as the tippers when there was some improper
dissemination of the information leading to trading. The second is
the nationality of the issuer. 7 Third, we need to know where the
information was obtained (i.e., where the source of the information
was located). Last, we need to know where the trading occurred-
what market mechanisms were used?'8 Where the answers to most
of those questions are a single country, the case for claiming
jurisdiction is easy. When the answers are scattered, it is harder.
Obviously, there are many possible permutations. To focus the
analysis, I will pose a single hypothetical case. Imagine that a
British company is negotiating to acquire a Brazilian company. An
attorney whose firm in London is advising the acquiring company
on certain aspects of the transaction tips a friend in Sweden. The
Swedish friend purchases securities in the Brazilian company on the
New York Stock Exchange. Here we have four countries whose
14. See Markus Kroll & Rahel Gimmel, Acquittal in Insider Trading Case
Reinforces Concerns About Rules, 6 WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA), no. 2, at 8 (Feb.
2000) (expressing doubts about effectiveness of Swiss law).
15. Similarly, once an investigation has begun that involves largely domestic
activity, the discovery of some foreign element brings an almost irresistible
temptation to pursue the one trading overseas.
16. For other efforts to work through this problem, whether as a matter of law
or policy, see Merritt Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate What?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., no. 4, at 263 (1992); Ronald E.
Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375.
17. Here, we might consider both the site of its incorporation and its principal
place of business.
18. That is, what exchange or trading system was the trade executed on, and
what broker-dealers or other intermediary was used to execute it.
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interests are at stake; the question is whose interests are strongest,
and why.
To address this, it is necessary to think first about why insider
trading is regulated in the first place. Indeed, one reason for going
through this exercise, apart from its practical importance in our
global economy, is that it forces some rigorous inquiry into a
question that is rarely thought about very hard outside the
academic community. In the United States, the gradual strength-
ening of the prohibition against insider trading, and the devotion of
a good bit of enforcement resources to combating it, has been as
much a form of cultural expression as economic regulation. That is
not to say that there are not good functional reasons to ban the
most abusive forms of insider trading. As we shall see, there
probably are. But the issue in the U.S. has a symbolic, indeed
almost mythic, character. 9 The ban on insider trading is a highly
salient statement about the subordinate place of insider-fiduciaries
(and their friends and associates) vis-A-vis the trading public. It
flips the hierarchy-the power of economic elites-that otherwise
appears to dominate. In this sense, it is a "brand" message to
advertise the openness of the American securities markets to public
investors by creating the image these investor interests are
paramount. It would be presumptuous of me to say whether insider
trading regulation in other countries plays the same rhetorical
role.' I would at least venture a guess that many countries have
simply (and without deep thought) mimicked the U.S.2 system of
regulation in their own brand-building efforts to create domestic
securities markets of reasonable depth and liquidity, without giving
that much thought as to why.
II. The Rationales for Insider Trading Regulation
The academic debate over the regulation of insider trading has
had a long and fascinating intellectual history. Initially, the
19. See Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note 1, at 1328-31.
20. In a recent article, Barry Rider complains that Great Britain has not
thought through its reasons for insider trading regulation and enforcement all that
well either. See Barry A.K. Rider, The Control of Insider Trading: Smoke and
Mirrors., 1 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 271 (1999).
21. The U.S. is not alone, of course. In terms of chronology, France was the
other major capital marketplace nation to address insider trading in the 1960's.
See James Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 23 (Jan.
1988). Canada (in the Province of Ontario) and Australia also took significant and
influential statutory steps toward regulation during that decade. See Stephen
Herne, Inside Information: Definitions in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.,
8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 1 (1986).
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appropriateness of the ban in the U.S. was simply taken as a
political given; little thought was given to the "why" question.
Indeed, the genesis of modern insider trading regulation in the U.S.
began when a law professor, William Cary, was appointed chairman
of the SEC in 1961.22 His decision to federalize the law of insider
trading was explicitly based on a desire to superimpose a strong
fiduciary ethic on the U.S. stock markets, to distinguish them from
the elites-dominated markets in other countries. By the late 1960's,
however, an intellectual counter-attack was mounted against insider
trading prohibition. It was led by Henry Manne, whose influence is
still felt today. 3 Through the early 1980's, academics increasingly
doubted whether insider trading regulation was worth the effort, if
not outright dysfunctional.24  But in the 1980's, there was a
noticeable turn-around, as more and more economics-oriented
scholars began to identify reasons to favor some sort of regulation.25
Today, the balance of sophisticated legal commentary is in favor of
insider trading regulation, though even among its supporters there
remains vigorous debate over exactly what scope and form the
regulation should take.26
The standard explanations for a ban on insider trading fall into
two main categories.
A. Investor Protection
The first, and most conventional, is investor protection. The
initial focus here was on the harm to contemporaneous marketplace
traders who sold to or bought from the insider at an informational
disadvantage. These appear to be the most visible persons
exploited by the insider. This argument has long been seen as
22. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (2d ed.
1995).
23. See HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
For a recent celebration of Manne's contributions, see Symposium: The Legacy of
Henry G. Manne-Pioneer in Law & Economics and Innovation in Legal
Education, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (1999).
24. E.g., Michael Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1980).
25. A key step here was the work of perhaps the most influential conservative
law and economics scholar, Frank Easterbrook. See Frank Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information,
1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309.
26. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV.
1589, 1620 (1999). For a collection and analysis of the full range of arguments, see
James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Reply to the Chicago School,
1986 DUKE L.J. 628.
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weak, however, in light of the workings of modern securities
markets. Except in rare circumstances, these traders were not
induced into the market by the insider, nor did they rely on any
information generated by the insider. They independently entered
their buy/sell orders, taking the foreseeable risk that there was
some undisclosed information that might make their trade
unprofitable. In other words, there is no real causation or reliance
of the sort that would suggest fraud. Careful study of the market
impact of insider trading has led to the conclusion that so far as
contemporaneous traders are concerned, the most plausible story of
harm that can be told is that the insiders might crowd out other
persons on the same side of the transaction who might have bought
or sold at a somewhat more favorable price."
The inquiry has thus shifted to a revised statement of the
problem: how do traders respond ex ante to the risk that there may
be insiders in the market with an access-based informational
advantage? Here, we can see one group of persons who are
adversely affected-specialists and marketmakers whose constant
buy/sell activity essentially forces them to internalize the risk that
some who seek to trade with them have an informational
advantage.' The rational response of the professional trader is to
widen the bid-ask spread so as to incorporate a risk premium. This,
in turn, has a spillover adverse effect on others who trade with
them, by delivering inferior pricing. If this argument is right, as
many financial economists argue, then we do have a rationale for
regulation so long as the costs of enforcement are less than the
gains in terms of reduced spreads. A recent Indiana University
study, for example, estimates the average cost of capital benefit of
enforced insider trading regulation for nations that have recently
become insider trading regulators at approximately 5%, a
statistically significant figure.3"
What about the ex ante behavior of public investors? Will they
either withdraw from the market for fear of insider trading,
reducing its depth and liquidity? The economic argument here is
27. See William Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC
Rule lOb-5?, 54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
2& See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of
Monopoly Specialists, 62 J. Bus. 211 (1989). See also Nicholas Georgakopoulos,
Insider Trading as a Transaction Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
29. On enforcement in this context, see Paul Demarzo et al., The Optimal
Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations, 106 J. POL. ECON. 602 (1998).
30. Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 13.
2000]
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quite complex, but there is little affirmative support for the idea of
anything near complete withdrawal, even though any impact on the
cost of equity will presumably affect demand to some extent. The
Indiana University study gives a 5% figure for the impact of
enforced regulation, reflecting the average market price effect of
the first prosecution. To be sure, a more sustained pattern of
enforcement might well raise the number by some unknown
amount. Nonetheless, I suspect that the ultimate figure would not
be that much higher.
To me, the real question that investors face is not insider
trading standing alone but rather the quality of regulation (or
market forces) that cause issuers to publicize information fairly
promptly. In a world that reliably forces prompt public disclosure
through either legal regulation or market discipline, the risk faced
by traders because of the possible presence of insider trading
should be limited.31 Severe concern about insider trading should
occur largely in environments of very low transparency, and on
close inspection, it is the lack of transparency, far more than the
insider activity, that should drive the regulatory response.
Yet concern about "investor confidence" in the face of insider
trading remains, in the U.S. at least, the express motivation behind
an aggressive system of regulation-even in a setting of high
transparency. This rhetoric, which has become at times almost a
moral crusade, echoes repeatedly in the cases running from Cady,
Roberts in 1961 through the Supreme Court's most recent endorse-
ment of expansive insider trading regulation in United States v.
O'Hagan.32 As I suggested earlier, I think the idea that insider
trading regulation is necessary to retain the confidence of public
investors in the American markets something more of a "brand
slogan" than a well-grounded empirical prediction.
But still, this does not mean that it is an unjustifiable
regulatory step. First, there remains the technical connection
between the interests of public investors and stock price spreads,
which are affected by the adverse selection risks of insider trading.
My only critical point was that it is hard to ground the aggressive
kind of insider trading regulation one finds in the U.S. at this level
of subtlety. A 5% (or even 10%) effect on cost of capital justifies
intervention, even if it does not warrant a moral crusade. Second,
31. The close connection between mandatory disclosure and insider trading is
well illustrated by the SEC's recent proposal for Regulation FD, which would
demand prompt public disclosure anytime there was intentional or inadvertent
selective disclosure to a favored investor or analyst.
32. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
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investors may actually respond in various ways to myths and
symbols, beyond the rational content of the underlying message."
Insider trading regulation may be good advertising and public
relations, whatever the discrete economic benefits it delivers.34 In
the end, this latter point may well be the best descriptive
explanation of the rationale behind the U.S. system so far as
investor protection is concerned.
B. Corporate Law
The foregoing argument actually splits academics interested in
the law and finance. Many are uncomfortable with the "brand"
argument as too soft to work in the rational world of investing-or
if they are not believers in market rationality, too far removed from
the emotions that really moves public investors: greed, herd
instincts and so forth. As to the bid-ask spread argument, the
question of whether costly and inevitably imperfect enforcement
can efficiently deliver lower spreads is debated."
Nevertheless, many such scholars come to support regulation
for a separate reason, namely, that it is the issuer's best interests to
do so. A regime in which insider trading is permissible poses a
number of problems from a corporate law perspective. First (and
probably foremost), insider trading can compromise the
confidentiality of sensitive information that is privileged from
mandatory disclosure,36 such as the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations. Efforts at secrecy can be broken when unusual stock
price trading has occurred in advance of any announcement,
33. Obviously, this question is closely related to the debate over market
efficiency. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). I do not
want to make the strong claim that an insider trading ban is a necessary symbol,
but rather an effective one for encouraging public investment generally. See
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note 1.
34. On the difficult balancing problems, see Khanna et al., Insider Trading,
Outside Search and Resource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May Disagree on
Insider Trading Restrictions, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (1994). Beyond the public
interest arguments, one can also claim that insider trading prohibitions work to the
private pecuniary benefit of some large investors. See David Haddock & Jonathan
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading Regulation, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449
(1987).
35. This is an important point-insider trading enforcement is very costly,
especially if a jurisdiction wants to pursue a large portion of suspicious trades. For
a criticism emphasizing this cost of insider trading regulation and enforcement, see
Dooley, supra note 24.
36. See Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801 (1980).
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exposing the issuer to intense press, market and regulatory scrutiny.
Second, confidential information is a valuable form of corporate
property. Allowing insiders to profit from it a form of waste-
irrational from the issuer's perspective unless there is a discrete
trade off for a lowered salary.38 Third, permitting insider trading
gives key executives an incentive to create volatility in the
company's stock price, since they can profit from downswings as
well as upswings. From these points, we might predict that rational
issuers would seek to bar insider trading if they could.3 9
Two further points connect the foregoing to more traditional
concerns of investor protection. One is that permitting insider
trading gives company officials an incentive to delay the release of
information to the markets for longer than the business needs of
the company would suggest. Thus, there is a linkage between
insider trading regulation and the quality of the disclosure regime. °
The other goes back to ex ante reputation. If marketplace traders
(professional or otherwise) fear insider trading, they will demand a
risk premium, reflected in a lower stock price. In contrast, the
issuer's cost of capital improves as the risk premium diminishes.
This is simply the mirror image of the investor-protection point
made earlier.41
III. Connecting National Jurisdiction to Investor and Corporate
Interests
With the foregoing in mind, our task now is to decide which of
the four countries in our hypothetical- Sweden, Britain, Brazil, or
the U.S. -have good grounds to assert jurisdiction over the trading
in question. On the assumption that it is quite costly to devote
37. This point is emphasized in Judge Winter's opinion in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
38. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 274-75 (1986).
39. One question posed by critics of regulation is why don't they on their own.
See Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983). One answer seems to be that they lack the surveillance
capacity to make such a private prohibition stick. In other words, there is a public
goods character to market surveillance.
40. See Robert Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982).
41. In addition to these points, Merritt Fox has made the forceful argument
that insider trading prohibitions are appropriate as a control on agency costs,
which is important no so much in the name of investor or corporate protection but
because of the compelling regulatory interest in a fair system of allocating capital
and other economic resources among the various issuers in an economy. See Fox,
supra note 16; see also Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997).
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enforcement resources to the detection and prosecution of insider
trading, we should also look fairly closely at the extent to which
there will be domestic benefits that exceed the costs. Following
standard economic analysis, if the benefits of regulation spill over
to other countries without a comparable regime of cost-sharing, we
would expect enforcement to occur with less frequency than is
optimal (the classic externalities and "free rider" problem)."2 In this
sense, finding the best enforcer is really one of finding which
country benefits the most in terms of domestic economic policy
from the enforcement.43
A. Sweden: The Trader's Homeland
None of the interests described above justify any strong claim
of Swedish jurisdiction. Neither its investors nor its companies are
involved (if there are Swedish investors in the Brazilian
corporation, it is by happenstance, and gives Sweden no greater
interest than any other country whose investors own shares in that
issuer). The only possible linkage might be that Sweden believes
that its reputation in the world of investing might be tarnished by
the impression that it acts as a "Barbary Coast" for securities
pirates. In fact, in the U.S. that concern alone is sometimes invoked
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction as a legal matter." The U.S.
applies the securities laws to domestic conduct sufficient to state a
claim under Rule 10b-5 even when all of the harm is abroad. While
there may be some cases where that is a form of good citizenship in
the world of securities regulation, my sense is that the claim is fairly
42. For a study of the game theoretic problems of international securities
regulation flowing from the jurisdictional mismatch of costs and benefits, with
special attention to insider trading, see Amir Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2
Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 114-25 (1999);
Amir Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a
World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998).
43. One might properly ask whether jurisdiction should properly belong to any
country whose investors were trading "on the other side" of the insider. Indeed,
the U.S. and some other countries engage in the presumption that it is the
"contemporaneous traders" who are the victims of the insider. However, a few
points about this deserve emphasis. First, there is a fictional element to it: the
contemporaneous traders are probably not really the victims of anything
resembling fraud. Second, to the extent one wants to take this into account, it will
probably be subsumed in the interests of the country of residency-that country
will in all likelihood be the one with the greatest number of investors. To the
extent that we say that any country with a significant number of contemporaneous
traders should bring suit, the possibility for duplication and conflict is severe.
44. See United States v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1977); AVC
Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Part., 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
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weak in the insider trading context- especially if one of the other
countries is willing and able to prosecute. Sweden might owe some
other country a duty of regulatory cooperation in the latter
country's investigation of the trading, but that strikes me as the
extent of its appropriate involvement.
B. Britain: The Source Country
Britain has two interests in the problem at hand: it is home of
the tipper and of the acquiring company. It is also the place where
a theft of confidential information occurred. Simply from an
efficiency perspective, most of the initial investigatory work that
would have to be done in the case would be concentrated in Britain,
because the circumstances surrounding the obtaining and subse-
quent use of the information tends to be the heart of an insider
trading case.
Britain clearly has good cause to prosecute on some grounds.
We have a case of theft of information by a fiduciary, which alone
justifies jurisdiction. But the question is whether enforcement on
that basis is tied to any element of securities regulation. To be sure,
the situation described here is a standard "misappropriation" case.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the O'Hagan decision, squarely held
that Rule lOb-5 is violated when a person defrauds the source of the
information by secretly lining his pockets via insider trading while
pretending to be a loyal fiduciary. In the Court's eyes, the victims
were both the acquiring company (which, by the way, was a British
entity) and the trader's employer, a Minneapolis law firm that had
been retained by the acquiror. Following this logic, there would
seem to be a compelling case for jurisdiction whenever the sources
of the information are domestic -even if the trading occurs abroad.
Indeed, I would predict that the SEC would bring this case under
Rule 10b-5 were it in Britain's shoes. But should it? My sense is
that a careful reading of O'Hagan indicates that even though the
victims were the sources of the information, the justification for
regulation under the securities laws was that allowing trading
profits based on misappropriated information threatens the
integrity of the trading markets.5 In O'Hagan, all the trading was
domestic: the issuer, Pillsbury, was a Minneapolis-based multi-
national. If that is the message of the decision, there would be no
cause to claim jurisdiction as a matter of securities regulation
45. This point was made fairly explicitly by Justice Ginsburg. See O'Hagen,
supra note 3.
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absent some tie to the domestic markets. Moreover, because the
acquiror is not the issuer, many of the reasons for limiting trading
by insiders of the issuer (disclosure incentives, volatility incentives,
etc.) simply do not apply to provide "corporate" justifications for
regulation.
Still, Britain might be able to make a sound reputational
argument in a case like this. The reputation of the acquiring
company within the investment community is a matter in which
Britain could legitimately take an interest under the rubric of
securities law. Even stronger would be its interest in the reputation
for probity of the many players (investment banks, law firms,
accounting firms and the like) who facilitate merger and acquisition
transactions and other forms of securities activities in Britain.
Building a financial infrastructure that has a brand image of
honesty and loyalty is key for any nation seeking a significant role
in the world's capital marketplace.
C. Brazil: Home of the Issuer
To be sure, Brazil's interest here is less than it would be if the
leak or tip took place through the issuer's own activities, but it is
still substantial. Most importantly, Brazil has an interest in the
capital marketplace reputation of its companies for controlling
agency costs sufficiently well that investors can take equity
positions with reasonable confidence. This, in turn, serves its
interest in allocative efficiency as well.6 True, here the issuer has
done nothing that could possibly have compromised its reputation.
But ex ante, it is the risk of information exploitation (from
whatever source) that investors react to, and thus Brazil's interest
extends to the full range of abuses. We can add to this the
prediction-perhaps true on average today, though diminishing
gradually-that the largest percentage of investors in the Brazilian
corporation are Brazilians themselves, giving Brazil the greatest
claim to the extent that the rhetoric of protecting the person on the
other side of the trade continues to prevail.
Obviously, if the tip had come from within the Brazilian
company, as in the typical insider trading case, Brazil's interest
would strengthen considerably. Then there would be a
combination of the interests that here are divided up between
Brazil and Britain: namely, the interests in property protection, the
reputation of the financial infrastructure, etc.
46. See supra note 40.
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D. The United States: Site of the Transaction
As we saw before, the SEC seems to view the site of the
transaction as having primary importance so far as the assertion of
jurisdiction is concerned, and it has reasonable grounds today for
making this claim.4'7  To the extent that the concern about the
integrity of the marketplace-the reputation of the trading
mechanism--is really what drives insider trading regulation, then
the trading in our hypothetical plainly affects a significant U.S.
interest. So, too, if we make our concern the more specific one of
lowering bid-ask spreads on the domestic markets. Here, U.S.
expenditure of enforcement resources on cross-border insider
trading represents an investment in local brand quality and trading
efficiency. It may be cost effective even if the issuers (and many of
their investors) are foreign, so that the regulation benefits many
non-U.S. persons as well.4
Basing jurisdiction on trading market location has some
enforcement efficiencies as well. The bringing of an insider trading
case, in the U.S. at least, begins with the internal surveillance that is
done on the New York Stock Exchange, the Amex and NASDAQ.
It is then aided by the electronic record-keeping that the SEC
demands from registered broker-dealers who route trades to these
trading systems, which can be delivered quickly to the Commission
and analyzed for evidence of trading clusters and other circum-
stantial evidence of insider trading. This exchange-oriented
detection system fits well with the exercise of jurisdiction by the
exchange's country.
As sensible from a policy perspective as all this seems,
however, I find it conceptually problematic in light of the rapid
fragmentation of the world's trading markets. Assume that the
world markets gradually move to an integrated system of
competing marketmakers, linked by a variety of communication
networks that allow for the prompt execution and reporting of
trades to some centralized disclosure system.49 Add to this the
47. For a broad and powerful claim that securities market regulation is a key
to worldwide convergence of securities law, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999). See also James D. Cox, Regulatory
Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999).
48. As Coffee points out, there is a coherence argument here as well: it is
awkward for the U.S. to make a strong moral claim against insider trading unless it
says that all exchange-based insider trading is unlawful, regardless of the issuer's
domicile. See Coffee, supra note 47, at 694-95 & n. 202.
49. This is not implausible. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange
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growth of internet-based sites that investors could access directly,
with trades being crossed internally unless better execution could
be obtained elsewhere. These competing marketmakers and
trading centers would exist in many different countries (or perhaps
just the abstraction of cyberspace 0 ), with no predictable pattern in
terms of where any given trade would occur.
In this setting, one thing is clear: the notion of a "listing" of a
stock that is tied to a physical or electronic "place" where the
majority (or even the largest percentage) of daily trading in that
issuer's stock will occur collapses. Fragmentation means that
trading occurs in a highly diffused environment. Besides the
obvious difficulties that this poses for surveillance and invest-
igation," it raises the question of whether any given nation would
find it economical to seek to enforce its insider trading rules based
simply on the happenstance that a particular trade found its way to
some system located within its borders. Given a broad diffusion in
the benefits from insider trading regulation, there are massive free-
rider problems.
There are two counterarguments to consider, however. One is
that if, indeed, insider trading regulation lowers bid-ask spreads,
then a nation might be able to give "its" domestic trading systems a
competitive advantage, causing more trades to be routed there,
making this system (and its surrounding institutions) more
profitable. This, however, seems difficult to achieve in practice for
several reasons. First, the difficulty of surveillance and enforce-
ment in a fragmented environment means that it will be hard to
deliver a credible promise to limit insider trading. Further (but
closely related to the foregoing), we would still have to ask
precisely how much tangible benefit would come from aggressive
enforcement by the trading site nation. If the amount of benefit is
small, it may not offset other advantages (i.e., execution costs)
offered by other sites, in which case trades will continue to move to
those other locations notwithstanding suboptimal insider trading
enforcement. In that event, general bid-ask spreads will remain
sizable, because the marketmakers could not predict any systematic
Commission, NYSE's Recision of Rule 390 and Commission Request for
Comment on Market Fragmentation (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/pressarchive/2000press.shtml (last visited March 27, 2001).
50. On insider trading in cyberspace generally, see Robert A. Prentice, The
Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 263 (1999).
51. For a discussion, see Michael Mann et al., International Agreements and
Understandings for the Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29
INT'L LAW. 780, 837-38 (1992).
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benefit from insider trading regulation when the trades could so
easily end up in a place without a well-woven regulatory net.
The second possibility-which is gaining considerable attention
in academic circles in the U.S. -is to decouple the idea of a "listing"
from an expected trading site and simply make it a regulatory
commitment. 2 That is, issuers from around the world could elect to
be covered by U.S. (or any other country's) securities law, including
its system of insider trading regulation and enforcement. To
finance this, there would be some sort of taxation. Foreign issuers
would choose to pay this, and be subject to the resulting
enforcement risks, if they perceived that the U.S. (or other
country's) "brand" of securities regulation delivered more value in
terms of higher stock prices and lowered cost of capital. Some
commentators have suggested that this is indeed occurring today in
the form of increased foreign listings on U.S. exchanges," as a
means by which issuers can avoid the chill that comes from being
incorporated in a country with inferior investor protection. Even if
listings fall in the face of fragmentation, such a system could be
sustained simply by having foreign issuers "rent" some other
country's regulation.
We shall return to this possibility in the next section. But for
now, simply recognize that in the latter event, we would no longer
be using trading site as the basis for jurisdiction, but rather "issuer
consent." It is a new basis for jurisdiction that would apply even
when the issuer, the trader, the source, and the trading site are
outside the borders of the country in question.
IV. Sorting Out the Claims: Toward an Issuer-based Emphasis
To the extent that exchanges and trading locations remain
important places to which a nation could meaningfully devote
regulatory resources in such a way as to capture the benefits of
regulation for its constituents, basing insider trading jurisdiction on
that nexus alone seems appropriate. However, as I have just
suggested, I doubt that that system is stable in light of the potential
for rapid fragmentation and globalization of trading locations. To
the extent that this occurs, we are likely to observe a system of
international securities regulation in which multiple trading sites
52. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 So. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998). For a
similar thesis, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
53. See Coffee, supra note 47.
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will be regulated simply to assure proper execution of orders
without undue conflicts of interest, with little or no claim by either
the sites or the regulatory authorities as to matters relating to the
governance or disclosure policies of issuers whose shares can be
traded on them.
If this is the world toward which we are moving, then a shift in
regulatory philosophy is needed-for insider trading as well as
securities regulation generally. The clear-cut candidate to fill the
void would be an emphasis on domestic issuers.4 Even if we
assume little about who the shareholders of domestic corporations
are (i.e., the extent to which they are citizens of the issuer's home
country), a country's interest in the reputation of its domestic
issuers for controlling agency costs is compelling. If the U.S., for
example, can make its domestic issuers attractive in the world's
trading markets by stamping its brand of insider trading regulation
on them, then the benefits in terms of cost of capital and allocative
efficiency will be considerable. And given the relative mobility of
the idea of "site of incorporation"-whether one defines that in
terms of the site of incorporation or principal place of business-
there will be obvious incentives to adopt relatively efficient forms
of regulation lest issuers be penalized by the markets and/or move
elsewhere. Identifying the issuer's home country as the primary
insider trading regulator also has the benefit of enforcement
efficiency: usually, though not inevitably, the investigation of
insider trading begins with people and data associated with the
issuer.5 Having said this, I would agree that there is also a good
case for encouraging nations to use their enforcement powers to
protect the reputations of domestic financial intermediaries and
service providers (i.e., Britain in our hypothetical).
Beyond this, the interesting question is whether a country
should seek to rent out its form of regulation, permitting foreign
issuers simply to commit to obeying its law (and devoting
enforcement resources so as to bond the issuer's commitment) as a
way of escaping inferior securities regulation in their home
countries. As noted earlier, we arguably have this kind of system
today, in terms of secondary listings on major exchanges, which has
the effect of triggering that country's securities laws in nearly full
force. Even if I am correct that listings are no longer a stable base,
54. This is the clear-cut recommendation of Fox, supra note 16, albeit for
somewhat different reasons than expressed here.
55. See supra p. 4.
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the commitment could eventually be made to the regulatory
authorities directly.
While this idea has substantial theoretical appeal, I am
skeptical of its workability. The key issue is one of economics.
Given that the benefits of the regulation will largely be external,
issuers would have to be willing to pay a tax to make it worthwhile
for the regulator to act. In this regard, note the high enforcement
costs (not to mention legal and practical difficulties) associated with
investigations that have an almost exclusively extraterritorial
character. The tax, in other words, would likely be fairly high to
cover the costs. To predict that issuers will indeed choose to pay it,
each of the following would have to be true:
(1) markets would have to be sufficiently efficient to price
the added value of the regulation with some degree of
precision;56
(2) regulating nations would have to make a sufficient
investment in extraterritorial regulation that the markets
would assume the quality of not only the law on the
books but also the willingness to devote resources to
extraterritorial cases -notwithstanding domestic political
pressures to shift those resources secretly in other
directions; 7
(3) issuer home countries would have to be willing to
cooperate with the regulating jurisdiction in order to
enable its enforcement; 8 and
(4) managers of the issuer must be willing irrevocably to
submit to this external jurisdiction to gain the benefits of
a better stock price notwithstanding the personal costs
associated with moving to a stricter regime.
56. For skepticism on this, see Cox, supra note 47, at 1233-35.
57. Given the opaque nature of governmental enforcement, there needs to be
some bonding mechanism by which investors can take confidence that there will be
appropriate enforcement not only now, but in the future. Some scholars point to
Delaware as a state that, in corporate law, has succeeded in making a credible
commitment to the capital marketplace about the stable quality of its law. Note,
however, some unique features about Delaware. First, it assigns enforcement
capacity to private parties, not public enforcement. Second, it has a near
monopoly on public company incorporations (and is highly dependent on the
resulting revenues), giving it a unique incentive to act responsively.
58. Ironically, as regulatory responsibility shifted largely to a handful of
nations that could specialize in investor protection, the incentive for other
countries to build a solid infrastructure for securities enforcement would diminish.
59. For skepticism on this, see Lucian Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of
Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127
(1999).
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There is nothing theoretically impossible about this, my suspicion is
that one or more of them are likely to prove untrue. If so, it is hard
to envision such a system being built and sustained for some time.
In the intermediate-term, then, the sensible future of cross-border
insider trading enforcement is one that assigns to countries the task
of protecting of their own issuers and, derivatively, the investors in
those issuers.
I use the phrase "intermediate term," however, because in a
globalized capital marketplace, I am not even sure that issuer
domicile (however defined) is a sustainable standard. With respect
to truly multi-national companies, whose shareholders, managers
and other functional elements have no strong connection to any
given country, I find it difficult to believe that any one country will
use its scarce domestic investigatory and prosecutorial resources
aggressively to regulate insider trading. The enforcement costs to
be borne by that country are great, while the benefits go in
substantial part to foreign investors and intermediaries. While
some system of taxing issuers might be found, I have some doubts
about whether domestic agencies will really spend those resources
on international policing (within the hidden bureaucratic world of
prosecutorial discretion) when faced with competing claims
involving stronger domestic connections.
What, then, is the long-term solution? There are really only
two possibilities, both involving the creation of a multi-national
organization to which some of the tasks of insider trading
surveillance and enforcement (coupled, obviously, with a large
chunk of the work of securities regulation) is given. Conceivably,
this could be a private self-regulatory organization, playing some-
thing of the role that exchanges do today. While some of the work
of international securities regulation could fit into such an
organization, I doubt that it works for insider trading. SRO's are
workable vehicles for coordinating the behavior of business actors
with reputational interests in continuing to be a member in good
standing of the community. But insider trading does not involve
that: it involves a wide variety of persons, insiders and outsiders,
who see a chance at quick profits. The necessary alternative, then,
is a public international organization - IOSCO recharacterized on a
grand scale-with full criminal and civil power.6° We are far from
having such a body, with self-evident and perhaps insuperable
60. For a comparable claim within the European context, see Roberta S.
Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANS. L.
9 (1999).
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political difficulties standing in the way of its creation. My end
point simply is this: absent such an organization, the problems
associated with cross-border insider trading enforcement will grow
without much hope of satisfactory deterrence.
